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Abstract
In current hate speech datasets, there exists
a high correlation between annotators’ per-
ceptions of toxicity and signals of African
American English (AAE). This bias in anno-
tated training data and the tendency of ma-
chine learning models to amplify it cause
AAE text to often be mislabeled as abu-
sive/offensive/hate speech with a high false
positive rate by current hate speech classifiers.
In this paper, we use adversarial training to
mitigate this bias, introducing a hate speech
classifier that learns to detect toxic sentences
while demoting confounds corresponding to
AAE texts. Experimental results on a hate
speech dataset and an AAE dataset suggest
that our method is able to substantially reduce
the false positive rate for AAE text while only
minimally affecting the performance of hate
speech classification.
1 Introduction
The prevalence of toxic comments on social media
and the mental toll on human moderators has gener-
ated much interest in automated systems for detect-
ing hate speech and abusive language (Schmidt and
Wiegand, 2017; Fortuna and Nunes, 2018), espe-
cially language that targets particular social groups
(Silva et al., 2016; Mondal et al., 2017; Mathew
et al., 2019). However, deploying these systems
without careful consideration of social context can
increase bias, marginalization, and exclusion (Ben-
der and Friedman, 2018; Waseem and Hovy, 2016).
Most datasets currently used to train hate speech
classifiers were collected through crowdsourced
annotations (Davidson et al., 2017; Founta et al.,
2018), despite the risk of annotator bias. Waseem
(2016) show that non-experts are more likely to
label text as abusive than expert annotators, and
Sap et al. (2019) show how lack of social con-
text in annotation tasks further increases the risk
of annotator bias, which can in turn lead to the
marginalization of racial minorities. More specifi-
cally, annotators are more likely to label comments
as abusive if they are written in African American
English (AAE). These comments are assumed to
be incorrectly labelled, as annotators do not mark
them as abusive if they are properly primed with
dialect and race information (Sap et al., 2019).
These biases in annotations are absorbed and am-
plified by automated classifiers. Classifiers trained
on biased annotations are more likely to incor-
rectly label AAE text as abusive than non-AAE
text: the false positive rate (FPR) is higher for
AAE text, which risks further suppressing an al-
ready marginalized community. More formally, the
disparity in FPR between groups is a violation of
the Equality of Opportunity criterion, a commonly
used metric of algorithmic fairness whose viola-
tion indicates discrimination (Hardt et al., 2016).
According to Sap et al. (2019), the false positive
rate for hate speech/abusive language of the AAE
dialect can reach as high as 46%.
Thus, Sap et al. (2019) reveal two related issues
in the task of hate speech classification: the first
is biases in existing annotations, and the second is
model tendencies to absorb and even amplify bi-
ases from spurious correlations present in datasets
(Zhao et al., 2017; Lloyd, 2018). While current
datasets can be re-annotated, this process is time-
consuming and expensive. Furthermore, even with
perfect annotations, current hate speech detection
models may still learn and amplify spurious corre-
lations between AAE and abusive language (Zhao
et al., 2017; Lloyd, 2018).
In this work, we present an adversarial approach
to mitigating the risk of racial bias in hate speech
classifiers, even when there might be annotation
bias in the underlying training data. In §2, we de-
scribe our methodology in general terms, as it can
be useful in any text classification task that seeks
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to predict a target attribute (here, toxicity) without
basing predictions on a protected attribute (here,
AAE). Although we aim at preserving the utility
of classification models, our primary goal is not to
improve the raw performance over predicting the
target attribute (hate speech detection), but rather
to reduce the influence of the protected attribute.
In §3 and §4, we evaluate how well our approach
reduces the risk of racial bias in hate speech classifi-
cation by measuring the FPR of AAE text, i.e., how
often the model incorrectly labels AAE text as abu-
sive. We evaluate our methodology using two types
of data: (1) a dataset inferred to be AAE using de-
mographic information (Blodgett et al., 2016), and
(2) datasets annotated for hate speech (Davidson
et al., 2017; Founta et al., 2018) where we automat-
ically infer AAE dialect and then demote indicators
of AAE in corresponding hate speech classifiers.
Overall, our approach decreases the dialectal infor-
mation encoded by the hate speech model, leading
to a 2.2–3.2 percent reduction in FPR for AAE
text, without sacrificing the utility of hate speech
classification.
2 Methodology
Our goal is to train a model that can predict a tar-
get attribute (abusive or not abusive language), but
that does not base decisions off of confounds in
data that result from protected attributes (e.g., AAE
dialect). In order to achieve this, we use an adver-
sarial objective, which discourages the model from
encoding information about the protected attribute.
Adversarial training is widely known for success-
fully adapting models to learn representations that
are invariant to undesired attributes, such as demo-
graphics and topics, though they rarely disentangle
attributes completely (Li et al., 2018; Elazar and
Goldberg, 2018; Kumar et al., 2019; Lample et al.,
2019; Landeiro et al., 2019).
Model Architecture Our demotion model con-
sists of three parts: 1) An encoder H that encodes
the text into a high dimensional space; 2) A binary
classifier C that predicts the target attribute from
the input text; 3) An adversary D that predicts the
protected attribute from the input text. We used a
single-layer bidirectional LSTM encoder with an
attention mechanism. Both classifiers are two-layer
MLPs with a tanh activation function.
Training Procedure Each data point in our train-
ing set is a triplet {(xi, yi, zi); i ∈ 1 . . . N}, where
xi is the input text, yi is the label for the target
attribute and zi is label of the protected attribute.
The (xi, yi) tuples are used to train the classifier C,
and the (xi, zi) tuple is used to train the adversary
D.
We adapt a two-phase training procedure from
Kumar et al. (2019). We use this procedure be-
cause Kumar et al. (2019) show that their model is
more effective than alternatives in a setting similar
to ours, where the lexical indicators of the target
and protected attributes are closely connected (e.g.,
words that are common in non-abusive AAE and
are also common in abusive language datasets). In
the first phase (pre-training), we use the standard
supervised training objective to update encoder H
and classifier C:
min
C,H
N∑
i=1
L(C(H(xi)), yi) (1)
After pre-training, the encoder should encode all
relevant information that is useful for predicting the
target attribute, including information predictive of
the protected attribute.
In the second phase, starting from the best-
performing checkpoint in the pre-training phase,
we alternate training the adversary D with Equa-
tion 2 and the other two models (H and C) with
Equation 3:
min
D
1
N
N∑
i=1
L(D(H(xi)), zi) (2)
min
H,C
1
N
N∑
i=1
α · L(C(H(xi)), yi)+
(1− α) · L(D(H(xi)), 0.5)
(3)
Unlike Kumar et al. (2019), we introduce a
hyper-parameter α, which controls the balance be-
tween the two loss terms in Equation 3. We find
that α is crucial for correctly training the model
(we detail this in §3).
We first train the adversary to predict the pro-
tected attribute from the text representations out-
putted by the encoder. We then train the encoder
to “fool” the adversary by generating representa-
tions that will cause the adversary to output random
guesses, rather than accurate predictions. At the
same time, we train the classifier to predict the
target attribute from the encoder output.
Dataset Example
Founta et al. (2018) I am hungry and I am dirty as hell bruh, need dat shower and dem calories
Blodgett et al. (2016) so much energy and time wasted hatin on someone when alla that coulda been
put towards makin yourself better.... a https://t.co/awCg1nCt8t
Table 1: Example from Founta et al. (2018) and Blodgett et al. (2016) where the state-of-the-art model misclassifies
innocuous tweets (inferred to be AAE) as abusive language. Our model correctly classifies these tweets as non-
toxic.
3 Experiments
3.1 Dataset
To the best of our knowledge, there are no datasets
that are annotated both for toxicity and for AAE
dialect. Instead, we use two toxicity datasets and
one English dialect dataset that are all from the
same domain (Twitter):
DWMW17 (Davidson et al., 2017) A Twitter
dataset that contains 25K tweets annotated as hate
speech, offensive, or none. The authors define hate
speech as language that is used to expresses ha-
tred towards a targeted group or is intended to be
derogatory, to humiliate, or to insult the members
of the group, and offensive language as language
that contains offensive terms which are not neces-
sarily inappropriate.
FDCL18 (Founta et al., 2018) A Twitter dataset
that contains 100K tweets annotated as hateful, abu-
sive, spam or none. This labeling scheme was de-
termined by conducting multiple rounds of crowd-
sourcing to understand how crowdworkers use dif-
ferent labels. Strongly impolite, rude, or hurtful
language is considered abusive, and the definition
of hate speech is the same as in DWMW17.
BROD16 (Blodgett et al., 2016) A 20K sample
out of a 1.15M English tweet corpus that is demo-
graphically associated with African American twit-
ter users. Further analysis shows that the dataset
contains significant linguistic features of African
American English.
In order to obtain dialect labels for the
DWMW17 and FDCL18, we use an off-the-shelf
demographically-aligned ensemble model (Blod-
gett et al., 2016) which learns a posterior topic
distribution (topics corresponding to African Amer-
ican, Hispanic, White and Other) at a user, message,
and word level. Blodgett et al. (2016) generate a
AAE-aligned corpus comprising tweets from users
labelled with at least 80% posterior probability as
using AAE-associated terms. Similarly, following
Sap et al. (2019), we assign AAE label to tweets
with at least 80% posterior probability of contain-
ing AAE-associated terms at the message level and
consider all other tweets as Non-AAE.
In order to obtain toxicity labels for the BROD16
dataset, we consider all tweets in this dataset to be
non-toxic. This is a reasonable assumption since
hate speech is relatively rare compared to the large
amount of non-abusive language on social media
(Founta et al., 2018).1
3.2 Training Parameters
In the pre-training phase, we train the model until
convergence and pick the best-performing check-
point for fine-tuning. In the fine-tuning phase, we
alternate training one single adversary and the clas-
sification model each for two epochs in one round
and train for 10 rounds in total.
We additionally tuned the α parameter used to
weight the loss terms in Equation 3 over validation
sets. We found that the value of α is important
for obtaining text representations containing less
dialectal information. A large α easily leads to
over-fitting and a drastic drop in validation accu-
racy for hate speech classification. However, a near
zero α severely reduces both training and valida-
tion accuracy. We ultimately set α = 0.05.
We use the same architecture as Sap et al. (2019)
as a baseline model, which does not contain an ad-
versarial objective. For both of this baseline model
and our model, because of the goal of demoting
the influence of AAE markers, we select the model
with the lowest false positive rate on validation set.
We train models on both DWMW17 and FDCL18
datasets, which we split into train/dev/test subsets
following Sap et al. (2019).
1We additionally did a simple check for abusive terms
using a list of 20 hate speech words, randomly selected from
Hatebase.org. We found that the percentage of sentences
containing these words is much lower in AAE dataset (≈ 2%)
than hate speech datasets (≈ 20%).
Dataset Accuracy F1
base ours base ours
DWMW17 91.90 90.68 75.15 76.05
FDCL18 81.18 80.27 66.15 66.80
Table 2: Accuracy and F1 scores for detecting abu-
sive language. F1 values are macro-averaged across all
classification categories (e.g. hate, offensive, none for
DWMW17). Our model achieves an accuracy and F1
on par with the baseline model.
Offensive Hate
base ours base ours
FDCL18-AAE 20.94 17.69 3.23 2.60
BROD16 16.44 14.29 5.03 4.52
Table 3: False positive rates (FPR), indicating how of-
ten AAE text is incorrectly classified as hateful or abu-
sive, when training with the FDCL18 dataset. Our
model consistently improves FPR for offensiveness,
and performs slightly better than the baseline for hate
speech detection.
4 Results and Analysis
Table 2 reports accuracy and F1 scores over the hate
speech classification task. Despite the adversarial
component in our model, which makes this task
more difficult, our model achieves comparable ac-
curacy as the baseline and even improves F1 score.
Furthermore, the results of our baseline model are
on par with those reported in Sap et al. (2019),
which verifies the validity of our implementation.
Next, we assess how well our demotion model
reduces the false positive rate in AAE text in two
ways: (1) we use our trained hate speech detec-
tion model to classify text inferred as AAE in
BROD16 dataset, in which we assume there is no
hateful or offensive speech and (2) we use our
trained hate speech detection model to classify
the test partitions of the DWMW17 and FDCL18
datasets, which are annotated for hateful and offen-
sive speech and for which we use an off-the-shelf
model to infer dialect, as described in §3. Thus,
for both evaluation criteria, we have or infer AAE
labels and toxicity labels, and we can compute how
often text inferred as AAE is misclassified as hate-
ful, abusive, or offensive.
Notably, Sap et al. (2019) show that datasets
that annotate text for hate speech without sufficient
context—like DWMW17 and FDCL18—may suf-
fer from inaccurate annotations, in that annotators
Offensive Hate
base ours base ours
DWMW17-AAE 38.27 42.59 0.70 2.06
BROD16 23.68 24.34 0.28 0.83
Table 4: False positive rates (FPR), indicating how of-
ten AAE text is incorrectly classified as hateful or of-
fensive, when training with DWMW17 dataset. Our
model fails to improve FPR over the baseline, since
97% of AAE-labeled instances in the dataset are also
labeled as toxic.
are more likely to label non-abusive AAE text as
abusive. However, despite the risk of inaccurate
annotations, we can still use these datasets to eval-
uate racial bias in toxicity detection because of our
focus on FPR. In particular, to analyze false posi-
tives, we need to analyze the classifier’s predictions
of the text as toxic, when annotators labeled it as
non-toxic. Sap et al. (2019) suggest that annotators
over-estimate the toxicity in AAE text, meaning
FPRs over the DWMW17 and FDCL18 test sets are
actually lower-bounds, and the true FPR is could
be even higher. Furthermore, if we assume that the
DWMW17 and FDCL18 training sets contain bi-
ased annotations, as suggested by Sap et al. (2019),
then a high FPR over the corresponding test sets
suggests that the classification model amplifies bias
in the training data, and labels non-toxic AAE text
as toxic even when annotators did not.
Table 3 reports results for both evaluation criteria
when we train the model on the FDCL18 data. In
both cases, our model successfully reduces FPR.
For abusive language detection in the FDCL18 test
set, the reduction in FPR is > 3; for hate speech
detection, the FPR of our model is also reduced
by 0.6 compared to the baseline model. We can
also observe a 2.2 and 0.5 reduction in FPR for
abusive speech and hate speech respectively when
evaluating on BROD16 data.
Table 4 reports results when we train the model
on the DWMW17 dataset. Unlike Table 3, unfor-
tunately, our model fails to reduce the FPR rate
for both offensive and hate speech of DWMW17
data. We also notice that our model trained with
DWMW17 performs much worse than the model
trained with FDCL18 data.
To understand the poor performance of our
model when trained and evaluated on DWMW17
data, we investigated the data distribution in the
test set and found that the vast majority of tweets
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Figure 1: Accuracy of the entire development set of
FDCL18 (top), and FPR rate for abusive (middle) and
hate (bottom) speech detection for tweets inferred as
AAE in the development set. X axis denotes the num-
ber of epochs. 0th epoch is the best checkpoint for pre-
training step, which is also the baseline model.
labeled as AAE by the dialect classifier were also
annotated as toxic (97%). Thus, the subset of the
data over which our model might improve FPR
consists of merely < 3% of the AAE portion of the
test set (49 tweets). In comparison, 70.98% of the
tweets in the FDCL18 test set that were labeled as
AAE were also annotated as toxic. Thus, we hy-
pothesize that the performance of our model over
the DWMW17 test set is not a representative esti-
mate of how well our model reduces bias, because
the improvable set in the DWMW17 is too small.
In Table 1, we provide two examples of
tweets that the baseline classifier misclassifies abu-
sive/offensive, but our model, correctly classifies
as non-toxic. Both examples are drawn from a
toxicity dataset and are classified as AAE by the
dialectal prediction model.
Trade-off between FPR and Accuracy In order
to better understand model performance, we ex-
plored the accuracy and FPR of our model through-
out the entire training process. We evaluate the best
checkpoint of the pre-trained model (0th epoch) and
checkpoints of each epoch during adversarial train-
ing and show the results in Figure 1. While the
baseline model (0th epoch, before any adversar-
ial training) achieves high accuracy, it also has a
high FPR rate, particularly over abusive language.
After adversarial training, the FPR rate decreases
with only minor changes in accuracy. However,
checkpoints with lower FPR rates also often have
lower accuracy. While Tables 2 and 3 suggest that
our model does achieve a balance between these
metrics, Figure 1 shows the difficulty of this task;
that is, it is difficult to disentangle these attributes
completely.
Eliminatation of protected attribute In Fig-
ure 2, we plot the validation accuracy of the ad-
versary through the entire training process in order
to verify that our model does learn a text represen-
tation at least partially free of dialectal information.
Further, we compare using one adversary during
training with using multiple adversaries (Kumar
et al., 2019). Through the course of training, the
validation accuracy of AAE prediction decreases
by about 6–10 and 2–5 points for both datasets,
indicating that dialectal information is gradually
removed from the encoded representation. How-
ever, after a certain training threshold (6 epochs for
DWMW17 and 8 epochs for FDCL18), the accu-
racy of the classifier (not shown) also drops drasti-
cally, indicating that dialectal information cannot
be completely eliminated from the text representa-
tion without also decreasing the accuracy of hate-
speech classification. Multiple adversaries gener-
ally cause a greater decrease in AAE prediction
than a single adversary, but do not necessarily lead
to a lower FPR and a higher classification accuracy.
We attribute this to the difference in experimental
setups: in our settings, we focus on one attribute
to demote, whereas Kumar et al. (2019) had to de-
mote ten latent attributes and thus required multiple
adversaries to stabilize the demotion model. Thus,
unlike in (Kumar et al., 2019), our settings do not
require multiple adversaries, and indeed, we do not
see improvements from using multiple adversaries.
5 Related Work
Preventing neural models from absorbing or even
amplifying unwanted artifacts present in datasets is
indispensable towards building machine learning
systems without unwanted biases.
One thread of work focuses on removing bias at
the data level, through reducing annotator bias (Sap
et al., 2019) and augmenting imbalanced datasets
(Jurgens et al., 2017). Dixon et al. (2018) propose
an unsupervised method based on balancing the
training set and employing a proposed measure-
ment for mitigating unintended bias in text clas-
sification models. Webster et al. (2018) present a
gender-balanced dataset with ambiguous name-pair
pronouns to provide diversity coverage for real-
world data. In addition to annotator bias, sampling
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Figure 2: Validation accuracy on AAE prediction of
the adversary in the whole training process. The green
line denotes the training setting of one adversary and
the orange line denotes the training setting of multiple
adversaries.
strategies also result in topic and author bias in
datasets of abusive language detection, leading to
decreased classification performance when testing
in more realistic settings, necessitating the adoption
of cross-domain evaluation for fairness (Wiegand
et al., 2019).
A related thread of work on debiasing focuses
at the model level (Zhao et al., 2019). Adversarial
training has been used to remove protected features
from word embeddings (Xie et al., 2017; Zhang
et al., 2018) and intermediate representations for
both texts (Elazar and Goldberg, 2018; Zhang et al.,
2018) and images (Edwards and Storkey, 2015;
Wang et al., 2018). Though previous works have
documented that adversarial training fails to oblit-
erate protected features, Kumar et al. (2019) show
that using multiple adversaries more effectively
forces the removal.
Along similar lines, multitask learning has been
adopted for learning task-invariant representations.
Vaidya et al. (2019) show that multitask training
on a related task e.g., identity prediction, allows
the model to shift focus to toxic-related elements
in hate speech detection.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we use adversarial training to demote
a protected attribute (AAE dialect) when training
a classifier to predict a target attribute (toxicity).
While we focus on AAE dialect and toxicity, our
methodology readily generalizes to other settings,
such as reducing bias related to age, gender, or
income-level in any other text classification task.
Overall, our approach has the potential to improve
fairness and reduce bias in NLP models.
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